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Nearly all Sub-Saharan and most Muslim countries permit 
p ~ l y g y n y . ~In parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, as many as 35y0 of 
married men take simultaneously more than one wife (Dorjahn 
1959), so that the majority of the population participates in a 
polygynous household at some time. I shall offer insights into 
the determinants of polygyny through an analysis of a pre­
dominantly Kanuri city in northeastern Nigeria that makes use 
of economic theory and econometrics (the testing of economic 
hypotheses). 
Economic theory contributes to the understanding of some 
aspects of cultural phenomena. Its applicability extends beyond 
the domain of industrial production to encompass the everyday 
decisions of mothers, children, lovers, or marriage-brokers, 
This paper is based on my dissertation research as a candidate 
for a Ph.D. in economics. I am deeply indebted to Gary Becker and 
T. W. Schultz for inspiring my interest in anthropology and to 
Ronald Cohen for demonstrating tolerance for economics and gen- 
erosity with his data. The material kindly offered by Jean Steckle 
and Linda Ewanyk provided the initial stimulus to the research. 
The only Muslim countries limiting polygyny are Turkey, 
Tunisia, and Pakistan. Egypt is in the process of joining them. 
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uithout distinction as to language or country. This broad focus 
follows from the definition of economics as the study of the allo- 
cation of scarce means to competing ends. Economic theory 
initiates an analysis of individual behavior in the process of 
constrained choice by making simplifying assumptions. Econo- 
mists assume very simple rules of psychology, not because they 
naively overlook nuances of individual motivation, anxieties, 
or rationalizations, but because they hope that these simple 
abstractions will be sufficient approximations for the purpose. 
The criterion is that the theory work-that it produce reason- 
ably accurate predictions. 
A central behavioral assumption made by economists is that 
people are rational. Man, as pictured by economists, tries to 
utilize his resources in such a way that a t  the margin he achieves 
optimal allocation; if he is a worker, he equates the marginal 
benefit of supplying one more hour of work to its marginal cost 
in terms of the alternative allotments of time. Economists do 
not claim, however, that workers (or businessmen) actually 
reach their decisions by consulting curves or functions showing 
marginal cost and revenue. Similarly, when the proponents of 
the "new home economics" (see Becker 1965, Lancaster 1966) 
develop concepts like the marginal cost of children or the mar- 
ginal revenue from seeking a husband, they do not claim to dis- 
cover new behavioral rules. The validity of the assumption of 
rationality lies, not in its descriptive accuracy, but in the fulfil!- 
ment of the theory it helps generate. Put another way, the prin- 
ciple is that the adequacy of a theory must be judged not by 
assessing the realism of its assumptions, but by examining the 
fit of its logical consequences with the phenomena it is designed 
to explain. 
The analysis presented here is "economic" in that, following 
Becker (1974) and Gronau (1970), it considers marriage as a 
situation of constrained choice. In contrast. most anthro~oloei- 
. " 
cal students of polygyny have used "economic" in a more re- 
stricted sense. Murdock (1949:36), who stresses the "basic im- 
portance of economic factors" in explaining- the incidence of 
polygyny in a society, includes in his concept of "economic" 
labor in agriculture, trades, and crafts, preparation of food, and 
political and religious functions. While Murdock excludes cer- 
tain domestic activities, Boserup (1974) leaves them all out. It  
is the same restricted concept of "economic" that Goody (1974: 
189) has in mind when he criticizes Boserup, maintaining that 
the "reasons behind polygyny are sexual and reproductive 
rather than economic and productive." "Economic" as I have 
defined it invalidates Goody's dichotomy: the economic anal- 
ysis of polygyny treats both its productive and its reproductive 
aspects. 
I shall consider marriage as a framework for domestic pro- 
duction and reproduction valued by the members of a society 
who follow rules of optimization. Individuals determine the ex- 
tent of their participation in a polygynous household according 
to endowed and acquired attributes. The application of eco- 
nomics as a heuristic methodology is the primary objective of 
the analysis. The testable hypotheses inferred relate to male 
and female characteristics on which information was collected 
in the city of Maiduguri. Regressions based on that informa- 
tion and on economic theory account for a positive, but small, 
proportion of the variation in polygyny among men and women. 
Maiduguri was selected for a study of polygyny on two funda- 
mental grounds. First, approximately at the same time three 
separate informative surveys were carried out in that predomi- 
nantly Kanuri city. In 1969, Ronald Cohen conducted inter- 
views for his study of divorce among the Kanuri (Cohen 1971). 
In  1973, Jean Steckle and Linda Ewanyk surveyed the city for 
their study of consumer preferences in grain utilization. That  
same year Margaret Hardiman undertook a household survey 
requested by city planners. The opportunity to use the raw data 
collected by Cohen and by Steckle and Ewanyk and to refer 
to Hardiman's survey partially compensated for the lack of 
personal fieldwork. Second, polygyny is common in Maidu- 
guri. In the surveys of Cohen and Steckle and Ewanyk, the 
average number of wives exceeds 1.5 (table 1). 
Maiduguri, the capital of Nigeria's Northeastern State, also 
functions as the center of the Bornu-Emirate, homeland of the 
Kanuri people. Despite a recent influx of animist and Christian 
migrants from the south and the west, the majority of the 
165,000 inhabitants adhere to Islam. According to Hardiman's 
survey, Maiduguri is 52y0 Kanuri, while other Muslims- 
Hausa, Fulanyi, and Shuwa Arabs-account for 2570 of the 
population. 
One of the principles of Islam limits the number of wives to 
four, a regulation strictly respected by Muslims and even non- 
Muslims: none of the households surveyed by Steckle and 
Ewanyk and Cohen had more than four wives. 
According to Cohen (1967, 1971), Islam pervades all aspects 
of Kanuri life. Women lead a separate social existence and take 
no part in public life. They are considered inferior and sexually 
untrustworthy, which results in ideas of seclusion and the "code 
of modesty." Table 1 suggests that well over half the wives of 
urban Kanuri men are secluded. A woman's sexual activities. 
her reproductive power, and some stipulated parts of her eco- 
nomic potential are transferable to her husband at marriage. 
The children belong to the father, and when divorce occurs 
they remain with him, unless they are not yet weaned. Divorce 
is extremely widespread and occurs approximately four times 
as often as in the United States (Cohen 1971 :125). As table 1 
shows, 69% of all marriages of the 45 men had ended in divorce, 
and the average duration of a marriage (including extant mar- 
riages!) was 7.7 years. From a comparison of the average num- 
bers of wives and marriages it follows that the latter figure is high 
(5.1 marriages per man) as a function of the high divorce rate. 
This partially reflects the simplicity of divorce; it occurs auto- 
matically if a husband tells his wife "I divorce you" three times. 
Cohen's total sample reported approximately 450 divorces, 
only 3y0 of which involved recourse to the courts. 
Maiduguri's economy relies on an old tradition of commerce 
with the East (Steckle and Ewanyk report [p. 211 that 33.6y0 of 
all men are traders and businessmen) and on a large sector of 
public services (12.1% are civil servants, 7.3y0 Koranic teach- 
ers, and 3.4y0 teachers and professionals). Only a small pro- 
portion of the population still owns a grain farm (16y0), and 
even fewer are farmers and fishermen (5.4y0). 
With so many teachers in the city, it is not surprising that 
a large segment of the population has received some schooling. 
TABLE 1 
STECKLEAND 
EWANYK COHEN 
A 
VARIABLE Mean SD Mean SD 
wives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 . 5 3  0 . 8  2 . 0  1 . 1  
  
seclusiona.. . . . . . . . . . . . .  0.65  0 . 4 8  
  
divorce. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 . 6 9  0 . 4 6  
  
duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7.7 6 . 8  
  
number of husband's 
 
marriages . . . . . . . . . . .  5 . 1  4 . 4  
  
incomeb. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3 . 1 9  1 . 8 6  3 . 9  1 . 3  
  
wealtho. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 . 5  0 . 7 9  
  
grain farma. . . . . . . . . . . .  0 . 1 6  0 . 8 5  
  
houseownera. . . . . . . . . . .  0 . 7 5  0 . 6 4  
  
waterstandpipea. . . . . . . .  0 . 3 5  0 . 4 8  
  
age of husband at time of 
 
interview. . . . . . . . . . . .  [mode: 36-45] 4 9 . 0  1 1 . 3  
age of husband at last 
marriage. . . . . . . . . . . .  3 2 . 3  9 . 9  
age of senior wife. . . . . . .  [mode: 25-35] 
age of last wife at mar- 
rlage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 7 . 4  5 . 3  
childrend . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2 . 5  2 . 3  2 . 3  
housewifea. . . . . . . . . . . . .  0 . 8 7  0 . 3 4  
education of husband0 . . 0 . 8 2  0 . 7 4  
education of senior wife. . 0 . 3 4  0 . 5  
NOTE: Number of observations is 754 for Steckle and Ewanyk, 207 marriages 
reported by 45 men for Cohen. Cohen's data are all for Kanuri; in Steckle 
and Ewanyk's, Kanuri are 57.6% of the sample. 
The slightly higher mean number of wives and of children reported by 
Cohen may be the result of the higher age and Kanuri background of his 
respondents. From a comparison with Hardiman's (1973) survey, conducted 
on a sample more than three times as large as Steckle and Ewanyk's, their 
average age of household heads seems representative, but they seem to over- 
represent the Hausa tribe, homeowners, and owners of waterstandpipes; 
these last two differences may result from the restriction to married house- 
holds and the greater wealth of the Hausa. 
a Dichotomous (dummy) variable; takes the value 1 or 0. 
Estimated on the basis of occupation. Ronald Cohen advised me on the 
relative ranks of occupations. The scales in the two sets are similar, but not 
identical, because of the different categories available. The Steckle and 
Ewanyk data are ranked from 0 to 5 (unemployed, general laborer, skilled 
craftsman, farmer, civil servant or teacher, trader). The Cohen data are 
ranked from 1 to 6 (laborer, craftsman, farmer or small trader, civil servant 
or teacher, trader, noble). 
Estimated by man interviewed; ranges from 1 to 4. 
Steckle and Ewanyk's definition is number of children under the age of 
14 living with the head of the household; Cohen's definition is total number 
of children born to a man by the time of his last marriage. 
Based on years of secular and religious schooling. 
C U R R E N T  A N T H R O P O I . O G Y  
According to Steckle and Ewanyk (p. 20), two-thirds of the 
men and one-third of the women have undergone formal school- 
ing, most of it Koranic. Although few Koranic schools are rec- 
ognized by the Ministry of Education, the skills they provide- 
including reading and writing ability-make them a worth­
while investment. In economists' language, schooling seems to 
raise individual productivity in terms of earning capacity and/ 
or ability to produce goods in the home. For instance, a woman 
with Koranic education may be more skilled as a hostess or 
mother than a woman who did not go to school. 
Most families (75%) live in their own homes. Generally 
there is no waterstandpipe in the compound, so many women 
and children have to carry water; otherwise the family buys 
water from carriers. 
Most of the woman's life centers around her husbands and 
children. She usually marries very young; by the age of 15 she 
has probably been married at least once. In  contrast, most men 
do not marry before age 20 (Cohen 1971). 
Women are most likely to bear children between the ages 
of 19 and 25 (Hardiman 1973, Steckle and Ewanyk 1973). 
Hardiman (1973: table 12) estimates the average fertility rate 
for women over 35 to be 3.2. The average number of children 
currently living in a man's household is reported by Steckle 
and Ewanyk as 2.5; Cohen gives the average number born to 
a man before and during a particular marriage as 2.3. 
While on the decline, child mortality is still very high. Hardi- 
man estimates the mortality rate of newborns at 212 per 1,000 
live births. Deaths of women at  childbirth do not appear to be 
very common, since only 2.3y0 of 265 urban Kanuri men's 
marriages ended with the death of the wife (from all causes). 
After age 34 a woman has a high probability of becoming a 
divorcke or a widow. In  contrast, males' marriages last longer. 
The survival of divorckes and widows depends on relatives, 
usually children. I t  appears from Hardiman's survey that many 
urban divorckes do not receive any support and die premature- 
ly, especially if they are childless. 
Limited labor-force participation increases woman's reliance 
on husband and children. Of the senior wives in the Steckle and 
Ewanyk sample, 87% are full-time housewives. 
Invoking simple price theory, I shall now examine the effect 
of each variable reported in table 1 on an individual's propen- 
sity to belong to a polygynous household. 
Firms transform purchased inputs into marketable output. In 
similar fashion, creative men and women transform scarce 
inputs into a valuable output; they produce meals, religious 
rituals, card games. children, etc. Some creations originate 
from the work of one individual, and some require cooperation. 
Some obtain public recognition in terms of a market value or 
a moral judgment, while for others appreciation only comes 
from the creators. The concern here is with marriage, an in- 
stitution for domestic production requiring the cooperation of 
at least one woman and one man. The theory views people as 
optimizing agents. Women supply wife-services demanded by 
men, and polygyny will be determined by the individual's rela- 
tive position in the market where the aggregate demand and 
supply for wife-services intersect. 
Following Bohannan's (1 949) distinction between uxorial and 
genetricial rights, one could introduce the concepts of a wom- 
an's uxorial services-including housekeeping and sex-and 
her genetricial services. Men also perform services. Although 
in most societies, and certainly in Maiduguri, the husband's 
contribution to housekeeping is negligible, fathers often par- 
ticipate in their children's education. For purposes of discus- 
sion, I shall ignore alternatives to marriage through which men 
and women can fulfill certain of their needs for housekeeping, 
sex, and offspring. 
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No creation is costless. Men and women spend time, energy, 
and, in most cultures, money for the privilege of conducting 
parental and other domestic activities. These costs limit the 
amounts produced. With no market prices reflecting the value 
of these activities, their value will only be subjective. A person's 
evaluation of marriage may encompass the benefits from that 
institution mentioned above, as well as a taste for love, domi- 
nance, or harmony. Assuming that people choose what makes 
them happy, the more they value the benefits from marriage, 
the larger the share of resources they will devote to it. For in- 
stance, if a man's only resource is time, he will commit propor- 
tionately more of it to his family directly as he values the family 
(he will pay more attention to them, instead of pleasing himself 
alone, and work harder, to provide for them). 
The output produced in marriage is limited by the costs in- 
volved. There are three categories of costs: premarital, marital, 
and postmarital. Premarital costs include the time spent search- 
ing for an appropriate partner, the costs of establishing a 
household, premarital transfer payments, and marriage cele- 
brations. Marital costs are the costs of actual production in 
marriage. An important factor of production is the time devoted 
to the process of creation. Here again, price is not necessarily 
market price (market wage). If one does not participate in the 
labor market, the opportunity cost of time in the home, or 
shadow wage, is determined implicitly. Postmarital costs refer 
to the monetary and readjustive costs of dissolution. 
The simple apparatus of supply and demand analysis can be 
used to derive predictions concerning polygyny. Supply and 
demand analysis is a means of classifying a limited number of 
variables that assist in the explanation of the phenomenon 
under study. In this particular case, it is convenient initially 
to think of attributes of men and women in terms of their effect 
on the demand and supply of wife-services, and eventually on 
polygyny. These attributes will be discussed with an eye to their 
empirical applicability, which limits the analysis even further. 
Although both men and women supply and demand services 
to and from each other, I will simplify the discussion by con- 
sidering women as suppliers of uxorial and genetricial services 
and men as demanders of these services. Both men and women, 
however, follow the same principle of optimization. Subject 
to their own valuation of their production with or without 
spouse, and considering the costs of production within or with- 
out marriage, they reach a maximal total production value. 
First let us consider men's demand for wife-services. In order 
to concentrate on male attributes, let us assume temporarily 
that there is only one type of woman. In figure 1 the horizontal 
axis represents the number of hours of daily uxorial and gene- 
tricial services performed by women in a household. The 
0 h 2  h i  Houri of wife-service 
FIG.1. The market for wife-services. 
vertical axis plots the value of an hour of wife-services. The 
demand schedule is downward-sloping, reflecting successive 
diminishing values of wife- service^.^ 
Next, let us consider the supply of wife-services by a repre- 
sentative woman. The vertical axis can now be reinterpreted 
as the compensation a woman requires for every hour of uxorial 
and genetricial service she supplies. That compensation may 
take the form of provision for her comfort, rights to the marital 
product, bridewealth, or a combination of these. The more a 
woman individually desires to be a wife and a mother, the 
lower the compensation she will require for the first hours of 
wife-service, and therefore the lower will be the supply sched- 
~ l e . ~  attachment to her For instance, the greater a woman's 
own kin, the more she will value her time outside of marriage 
and the higher will be her supply schedule. 
If polygyny itself is costless, the combined supply of wife- 
services by two identical women is simply the horizontal sum 
of their individual supply schedules (Sz in fig. 1). Similarly, 
one can obtain an aggregate supply curve of three or more 
wives. 
The intersection of the demand with the supply determines 
the number of hours of service a woman provides a husband 
who simultaneously demands that number. Thus far the anal- 
ysis does not indicate whether the husband whose demand ap- 
pears in figure 1 will marry one, two, or more of these identi- 
cal wives. The husband will prefer two wives to one wife, pro- 
vided that his valuation of the second wife's services is a t  least 
equal to the compensation she requires. A woman, however, 
will prefer monogamy because her total income, the product 
of her hours of work and the hourly compensation, is clearly 
larger under monogamy (wlhl) than under bigamy (wzh2). 
Therefore, the man and each of the two women have conflicting 
interests. 
The issue is resolved when each participant in this "market" 
for wife-services becomes aware of his or her alternatives. This 
interdependency between people is expressed through the mar- 
ket mechanism. In  the hypothetical culture described here, each 
man and woman defines his/her own demand and supply. Con- 
sequently, the equilibrium hourly compensation, or "wife­
wage," is determined at  the intersection of the aggregate de- 
mand by men and the aggregate supply by women. If this 
equilibrium wife-wage is larger than wz and smaller than wl, 
the individual man represented in figure 1 will be monogamous. 
If the wife-wage equals or is less than w?, he will be polygynous. 
Were the wife-wage higher than wl, this poor man would not 
marry at all; other men, who might demand more wife-services 
than he, would drive up the wife-wage, thereby preventing 
him from getting married. Given her alternatives, none of the 
identical women will consider marriage to somebody who com- 
pensates her less for her efforts. 
In order to identify the male determinants of polygyny, one 
The comparative value of the first unit will be higher when a 
man cannot obtain certain services in any other way than through 
a wife. This substitution between wife's services, on the one hand, 
and husband-time, purchased inputs (like commercial bread or 
refrigerators), and other women's services, on the other, is one 
reason for the negative slope of the demand curve. A second kind of 
substitution reinforces the negative slope. Wives contribute to the 
production of a restricted range of men's desires, including house- 
keeping, sex, and offspring. The negative slope also results from 
a substitution of satisfaction of these desires with others. 
In supplying her wife-services, a woman effects a double sub- 
stitution: between her uxorial-genetricial and other desires, on the 
one hand, and between marriage and alternative ways to satisfy 
her needs for being a wife and mother, on the other. In contrast 
to their effect on men's demand for wife-services, these substitutions 
lead to an upward-sloping supply schedule: after performing a 
certain amount of wife-services, the woman enjoys it less and less 
and requires higher compensation for her efforts. After a certain 
point she will refuse to perform any more daily wife-services-at 
which point the supply schedule becomes vertical. 
must isolate the factors accounting for the amount of wife- 
services demanded by various men participating in the same 
marriage market. In  that process, female attributes must be 
kept constant. This may be done by referring to the simple 
model with identical women, varying one male attribute at  a 
time and analyzing its effect on the demand for wife-services. 
First, the higher a man's income, the more wife-services he 
will demand. (Graphically, a higher income shifts the demand 
schedule upwards.) Second, education increases one's resources, 
in terms of both income and the ingenuity with which time 
is utilized; thus a man's education also generates an upward 
shift in his demand for wife-services. Third, if a man is limited 
in his ability to borrow funds when young, and if his income 
grows over time until it peaks, his demand for wife-services will 
increase with age until a certain point of maximum produc- 
tivity. As polygyny is a function of the demand for wife-services. 
three hypotheses may be offered: 
Hypothesis 1. Polygyny is a positive function of male income. 
Hypothesis 2. Polygyny is a positive function of male educa- 
tion. 
Hypothesis 3. Polygyny valies over a man's life-cycle; it 
maximizes when the man attains peak productivity. This curvi- 
linearity in the relationship between husband age and polygyny 
contrasts with the positive linear effect of age on polygyny iden- 
tified in other ~ t u d i e s . ~  
Next, let us look at  the effects of variations in female attri- 
butes on the number of wives in the household. Differences 
among women are partially reflected in their productivity as 
wives- or instance, more educated women are probably more 
efficient in running a household and are capable of providing 
better education for their children. From another perspective, 
certain women are more fecund: partially as a function of age. 
The productivity of a woman in marriage helps to explain the 
number of co-wives that she will have.- his may also be ex- 
pressed in terms of supply and demand analysis. 
Let us consider a man's demand for hours of wife-services 
where the productivity of wife-services is that of the least pro- 
ductive women in the market for wives. The supply of wife- 
services by one woman representing this lowest class is repre- 
sented by $1 in figure 1. Two women of this kind will supply $2. 
A third woman who is twice as productive as the first woman 
can perfectly substitute for two low-productivity women. Thus 
her supply schedule in terms of the first woman's productivity 
is $2. Each hour of work that she supplies to the household is 
worth two hours of the work of the low-productivity woman. 
Following this simple analysis, it is predicted that more edu- 
cated, more fecund, and more fertile women will have fewer 
co-wives. This conclusion should be qualified (1) by questioning 
the validity of considering only cases where women of different 
productivity can be substituted for each other and (2) by con- 
sidering variability in women's demand for marriage. 
In cases where women of different productivity do not sub- 
stitute for each other, they complement each other. For ex- 
ample, an educated woman managing a household where the 
other women are not educated may complement her co-wives. 
In such cases, educated women would have more co-wives. A 
priori, it is not clear whether women of different levels of edu- 
cation are complements or substitutes. More educated women 
are probably more efficient in various tasks like child raising, 
entertaining guests, or provision of emotional support to their 
husband, so that they may replace a larger number of other 
women. The gain from substituting a small number of the for- 
mer for a larger number of the latter will probably not be com- 
pletely neutralized by the advantages of an educated female's 
managerial predominance. 
6 Clignet (1970) is one study in which elders are viewed as the 
traditionally privileged segment entitled to polygyny. At a theoreti- 
cal level, no mention is made of a maximum seniority beyond 
which a man becomes less polygynous. 
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More educated women mav also have fewer co-wives be- 
cause of their greater demand for marriage. The more a woman 
values being married, the lower her supply schedule. The lower 
her supply schedule, the fewer co-wives she is likely to have, for 
at the market wife-wage adjusted for her skills she is willing 
to work more herself. An educated woman usuallv comes from 
a high-status family, controls more resources independently of 
marriage, and is likely to attach more importance to being 
married (assuming that higher income leads to more demand 
for goods produced in marriage). She also wants her husband 
to devote more attention to her, an additional factor responsible 
for educated women's having fewer co-wives. 
Despite the countereffect of complementarity, these con­
siderations suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Female education relates inversely to polygyny. 
Women differing in fertility correspondingly vary in (1) their 
supply of wife-services and (2) their demand for marriage. 
There is no reason to expect complementarity between wom- 
en varying in fertility. Therefore, if, given his resources, a man 
aims for a specific number of children, the possibility of polyg- 
yny widens the range of substitute routes towards that target. 
The identical number of offspring can be obtained with one 
unusually fertile \vife or with a number of wives of lower ex- 
pected fertility. There may exist a timing factor: if after a few 
vears it becomes auuarent that the first wife is not able to bear 
,. 
the desired number of children, the husband may start to look 
for a second wife. 
A woman of higher fertility may also use that asset to acquire 
more privileges for herself. This: in turn, may persuade her 
to choose a husband with fewer wives. Combining these two 
considerations brings us to another hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. Women of higher fertility have fewer co-wives. 
A direct way to test this will be to assess the relationship be- 
tween completed fertility per wife and number of wives. Al- 
ternatively, an element of expected fertility, the age of a woman, 
may be examined and tested to generate another hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6. Women at an age of peak fecundity have fewer 
co-wives. 
So far, I have discussed the differential impact of individual 
male and female characteristics on the propensity for member- 
ship in a polygynous household. Clearly, people live within a 
culture imposing constraints on their individual choices. These 
constraints affect a man's decision to marry in addition to other 
men's wife demands and the aggregate supply of wife-services 
by women. If his culture effectively prohibits polygyny, this 
man will be limited to choosing one wife at  a time. Observers 
have noticed that, on a worldwide scale, cultural background 
and religion considerably affect the legal status of polygyny (see 
Murdock 1949). 
In Maiduguri, however, once the attributes mentioned earlier 
are accounted for, the religious and ethnic background of a man 
or a woman should not have much impact on polygyny. The 
entire city belongs (to a certain degree) to a single polygynous 
marriage market. Indeed, no ethnic group living in Maiduguri 
prohibits polygyny. The geographical proximity imposes similar 
pressures on all men and women. Even though most people 
usually marry within their own group (Steckle and Ewanyk 
1973:14), the absence of an absolute prohibition 011 intermar­
riage implies that the entire city belongs to one market for wife- 
services. For instance, were there an acute shortage of men in 
one ethnic group, some of the women belonging to that group 
would marry men from other groups. This suggests a seventh 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7. Where all coexisting ethnic groups allow polyg- 
yny and intermarriage, there will be no major effect of ethnic 
group on the number of wives. 
. . 
Major sex imbalances among the tribes, due to demographic 
or political factors, would probably create differences in polyg- 
yny rates. In the region of Maiduguri, the Kanuri dominate 
the Shuwa Arabs politically, one result of which is an asym- 
metric intermarriage rule: Kanuri men may marry Shuwa 
women, but Shuwa men and Kanuri women are not allowed 
to marry (Cohen and Middleton 1970:14). The consequent 
higher sex ratio among marriageable Shuwa may lead to a 
lower degree of polygyny. 
Like all the preceding hypotheses, Hypothesis 7 states a par- 
tial effect: tribes generally do not differ in polygyny once other 
attributes of men and women are taken into account. In groups 
with more wealth and education, however, men may have 
more wives. 
According to sociological theory, the strength of a marital 
relationship is a direct function of the attraction within the 
marriage (Levinger 1968:580). In terms of an economic theory, 
fewer returns from marriage increase the likelihood of divorce 
(Becker, Landes, and Michaels 1975). To  the extent that polyg- 
yny reduces the attraction within each marriage contracied b; 
a polygynist and diminishes its returns a final hypothesis may 
suggested: 
Hypothesis 8. Polygyny will lead to more divorce. 
Cohen (1971:142) indicates the same prediction by using 
"simple logic." 
An increasing number of co-wives increases the probability 
that an individual marriage will end in divorce, for women 
marrying a polygynist are likely to have lower productivity 
and lower demand for marriage, thus creating a smaller total 
marital output and fewer returns from marriage. 
These eight hypotheses concerning polygyny will now be 
tested. 
RESULTS 
When testing for the effect of male and female attributes on 
the number of wives in the household, the characteristics of 
the mate(s) have to be kept constant. For example, if a man 
is indifferent as to whether he marries two average women or 
one gifted one, given their relative wages and productivity, 
little can be inferred about the number of his wives by simply 
comparing his endowments with other men's endowments. The 
following hypothesis is more informative: Given that a man has 
one average wife, his attributes lead us to expect him to have 
more than one wife. Consequently, the regressions simultane- 
ously include male and female attributes. Table 2 presents the 
results obtained with the two data-sets. The method of estima- 
tion was Ordinary Least Squares. 
The positive income effect predicted in Hypothesis 1 is 
verified in both linear regressions. Regression 1 estimates in- 
come through occupation and ownership of a waterstandpipe, 
a grain farm, and a house. All coefficients are positive and sig- 
n i f i ~ a n t . ~Regressions 2 and 3 reflect the same effect with oc- 
cupation as the measure of income. 
Hypothesis 2, predicting that education of the husband raises 
the number of wives, is confirmed by Regression 1. Given the 
poor quality of the proxy for income, however, education may 
affect the demand for wives through its effect on earnings. 
Hypothesis 3 was that a t  the age of peak productivity a man 
is likely to be married to more wives. In all regressions, older 
men appear to have more wives, but Regression 3, including 
variables of "age of husband at last marriage" and "age of 
husband at last marriage, square," also shows that the peak of 
polygyny occurs between ages 43 and 46,7 which seems con- 
sistent with a lifetime earnings profile. 
A variable is significant at the 95y0level if its t-statistic in the 
regression exceeds 1.96. 
In mathematical terms, a peak is a maximum. Let us call the 
variable "wives" Y and the variable "age of husband" X and ab- 
stract from the other variables. The regression equation can then be 
written as Y = ax + bX2. The first-order condition for a maximum 
(and a minimum) is that the first derivative equal zero, or n + 
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TABLE 2 
REGRESSIONSOF "WIVES" 
VARIABLE 
Male attributes 
occupation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

waterstandpipe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

grain farm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

houseowner. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

age of husband at time of interview.. . . . . . . . . . .  

age of husband at marriage.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

age of husband at marriage, square.. . . . . . . . . . .  

education of husband. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

husband Hausaa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

husband Shuwa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

husband Middle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

husband Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

husband Yoruba. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

husband Banan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

wealth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

Female attributes 

age of wife at interview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

age of wife at marriage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

age of wife at marriage, square.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

education of senior wife. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

average fertility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

wife's children. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

average number of children by previous wives. . .  

seclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

Constant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  

1 2 3 
Steckle and Cohen Cohen 
Ewanyk data data data 
0 . 0 5  ( 3 . 5 2 )  0 . 1 8  ( 4 . 5 2 )  0 . 1 7  ( 4 . 0 7 )  
0 . 3 2  ( 5 . 9 9 )  
0 . 2 3  ( 3 . 5 )  
0 . 2 3  ( 3 . 8 5 )  
0 . 1 1  (4 .82)  0 . 0 2  ( 4 . 2 4 )  
0.25 ( 7 . 4 7 )  
-0.0029 ( 6 . 1 )  
0 . 0 2  ( 2 . 7 )  
0 . 0 4  ( 0 . 6 )  
-0.26 ( 2 . 6 3 )  
-0 .03  (0 .28)  
-0 .19  (1 .36)  
- 0 . 3 9  ( 1 . 9 3 )  
- 0 . 2  (1 .05) 
0 . 1 6  ( 1 . 9 6 )  
0 . 0 2 3  ( 0 . 6 6 )  
-0.12 ( 1 . 9 )  -0 .13  ( 2 . 1 )  
0.0029 ( 1 . 8 1 )  0.0028 (1 .88) 
-0 .03  ( 2 . 5 4 )  
-0.07 ( 4 . 6 1 )  
-0 .14  ( 3 . 4 5 )  -0 .15  ( 3 . 3 )  
-0.08 ( 2 . 4 3 )  
0 . 2 4  ( 2 . 0 3 )  0 . 2 4  ( 2 . 1 3 )  
0 . 8 8  -4 .33  -3.87 
18.6 5 0 .  6  53.3 
NOTE:Number of observations is 897 for Steckle and Ewanyk, 207 for Cohen. The parameters in parentheses are the$-statistics. The meth- 
 
od is Ordinary Least Squares. 
 
a Hausa. Shuwa, Yoruba, Banan, Middle, and Other are names of tribes or groups of tribes; the remaining are the Kanuri. Cohen's data 
 
are for Kanuri only. 
 
Another male attribute included in Regression 2 is the hus- 
band's age at the time of the interview. The number of wives 
is probably a positive function of the length of time since mar- 
riage. We expect the number of women to whom a man who 
is now 7 0  years old was married when he was 25 to be larger 
than the number of wives married now to a man who is 25. The 
first base for that hypothesis is the health component. If a man 
living in Maiduguri has lived 70 years, he is probably healthier 
than average. That is an endowment leading to more marital 
output and more wives. Secondly, there may be a cohort effect. 
If there has been some modernization in Maiduguri, polygyny 
may be decreasing over time. This hypothesis is verified: the 
age of husband at the time of the interview is significantly posi- 
tive in both regressions. 
Ethnic-group membership appears to have little effect on the 
degree of polygyny. As expected in Hypothesis 7 ,  Regression 1 
shows that most tribes do not have a significantly different num- 
ber of wives than the Kanuri. While Hausa are Muslim, Middle 
and Other (aggregations) are mostly animist or Christian; com- 
pared to the Kanuri they are equally polygynous. One excep- 
tion, however, is that Shuwa Arabs, subject to disfavorable 
marriage rules imposed by the Kanuri, have fewer wives. 
Table 2 also shows the effect of female attributes on the num- 
ber of wives in the household. Regression 1 confirms Hypoth- 
esis 4:  the more educated the senior wife, the fewer her co-wives. 
This suggests that some men substitute marriage to one highly 
educated wife for marriage to a number of uneducated wives. 
Alternatively, this result may be interpreted as a greater de- 
mand for marital services on the part of educated women. 
Regression 3 shows that young and old women have more 
co-wives. As is predicted in Hypothesis 6, women at their age 
2hX = 0.  Therefore, X = -a/2h. Regression 2 tells us that a and h 
are respectively equal to 0.25 and -0.0029, so X = 43. 
of peak productivity have fewer co-wives. That peak age com- 
puted from the regression is 21 to 23,8which is consistent with 
the description of fertility patterns in Maiduguri. 
The negative relation between fertility per wife and polygyny 
predicted in Hypothesis 5 is confirmed in all regressions. In 
Regression 1 fertility per wife is established as an average for 
the household: Regression 2 includes the number of children 
, " 
born to a particular marriage between one man and one wom- 
an, while Regression 3 includes this last variable as well as an 
estimate of the fertility of previous wives. All three estimates of 
fertility per wife show a negative sign. This result does not in- 
validate the interpretation of age in terms of fertility, since a 
woman's potential as a mother is a function of her age and 
differs from her actual number of children. A problem with the 
variable "average fertility" is the spurious correlation, since 
the number of wives appears on both sides of the equation. I t  
is worth noticing that the two sets of data give similar results de- 
spite the difference in the definition of children. 
The variable "seclusion," reported by Cohen, differentiates 
between women who are secluded and women who are not. 
Women who agree to marry a husband who will seclude them 
are giving up the right to leave the home except on special oc- 
casions, thereby reflecting either a lower productivity or a 
smaller demand for satisfaction inside and outside marriage. 
The significantly positive sign may therefore be another evi- 
dence of substitution between more women of lower quality and 
fewer women of higher quality. Seclusion could also be an addi- 
tional proxy for husband wealth or a factor reflecting more taste 
for marriage on the part of the husband. The positive sign 
found in table 2 confirms any of these interpretations. 
Following the procedure of n. 7 , let us call the variable "age of 
wife" 3. The regression equation will be Y = a ' 3  + h 'z2 . At the 
minimum a' + 26'3 = 0 or 3 = -a',/ 26'. Plotting the values of 
a' and h', we obtain 3 = -0.12/(2 X 0.0029) = 21. 
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Cohen (1971) himself has shown a ~osi t ive relation betrleen 
~, 
divorce and polygyny. Using the method of cross-tabulation, 
he found that a higher percentage of polygynous than of monog- 
amous unions ends in divorce. Within the polygynous family, 
Cohen's tables show that the two-wife family increases the prob- 
ability of divorce of the younger wife, while the three-wife 
family increases the probability of divorce for the senior wife. 
Among urban males, Cohen also fourid a partial effect of 
polygyny on divorce. A dichotomous variable of monogamy 
accounted for a sizeable fraction of the variation in divorces. In 
his multivariate analysis of the probability that a marriage will 
end in divorce, Cohen found an effect of monogamy in addition 
to the effect of fertility of the present union and the effect of the 
secretiveness of the husband towards his wife. 
Table 3 explains the likelihood that a marriage will end in 
divorce in terms of the number of senior wives, attributes of the 
husband (age, wealth), attributes of the wife (age and age 
square), the duration of marriage, and the number of children 
(the direction of causality in the last two variables is ambigu- 
ous). While in his multivariate analysis Cohen used a dichoto- 
mous explanatory variable "monogamy," I use a continuous 
variable "wives," which local custom limits to 4. In addition. 
a dummy variable "wives = 4" is included to capture differ- 
ences between households with four wives and other house- 
holds. The method used is Probit, a maximum-likelihood meth- 
od of estimation especially designed to deal with dichotomous 
dependent variables; in this case a linear regression model and 
the Ordinary Least Squares method would be inappropriate. 
Cohen's finding is confirmed: polygyny has a positive effect 
on divorce. Like Cohen, I find a negative effect of fertility. In 
addition, table 3 shows a significant negative effect of husband's 
age and uealth. 
An economic analysis seems to contribute helpful insights into 
the determinants of polygyny. The simplifying assumption of 
rationality is the basis for hypotheses which have been tested 
and verified from data on the domestic sector of a preindustrial 
community. 
I have viewed people as determining their needs for marriage 
in terms of their personal values and resources and the costs 
involved in marriage. On the basis of additional assumptions, 
I have considered women as suppliers of marital services and 
men as demanders of these services. hlen were expected to 
marry more wives when their income, education, and age led 
them to demand more wife-services. A producti\.ity and a de- 
mand effect on the supply of bvife-services generated the pre- 
diction of an inverse relationship between polygyny and female 
education and betbveen polygyny and fertility. Ethnic-group 
membership was not expected to affect polygyny significantly. 
TABLE 3 
wives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.97 (3.72) 0.85 (2.40) 
wives = 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.46 (0.50) 
age of husband.. . . . . . . . . 
-0.10 (3.88) -0.10 (3.80) 
ageofwife . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  0.13(0.61)  0.12 (0.55) 
age of wife, square. . . . . . . 
-0 .OO  (0.40) -0.00 (0.35) 
wealth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-0.61 (2.20) -0.61 (2.19) 
duration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-0.14 (3.80) -0.14 (3.83) 
children.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
-0.55 (2.64) -0.54 (2.59) 
constant.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.52 (1.84) 4.64 (1 .89) 
NOTE:From Cohen data. The parameters in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
The method is Probit. 
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Finally, it was hypothesized that polygyny engenders divorce. 
-411 of these predictions were tested andmost of Them confirmed. 
The novelty of this study lies not in the discovery of an in- 
come effect on polygyny, but in the hypotheses generated by 
considering housewives as producers. The predictions of a life- 
cycle effect and of minor tribal effect on polygyny are also in- 
indicative of the fruitfulness of an economi; approach. The 
results depend crucially on simultaneous consideration of male 
and female attributes affecting the demand and supply of 
uxorial and genetricial services. hlethodologically, regression 
techniques of Ordinary Least Squares (table 2) and Probit 
(table 3) proved as useful in explaining polygyny and divorce 
as they have been in accounting for paradigms of market eco- 
nomics. The low coefficients of determination (R2).however, 
reflect the limitations of an economic analysis. More knowl- 
edge of the culture and more culturally meaningful data are 
necessary to improve the results. 
This study demonstrates, I think, the advantages of inter- 
disciplinary cooperation. An economic analysis vitally depends 
on the thorough cultural understanding anthropologists de- 
velop through fieldwork. Without the information on Maidu- 
guri generously transmitted by Ronald Cohen and the insights 
on polygyny previously published by other social scientists, 
this paper would not have been written 
The application of economic and econometric tools need not 
be restricted to a study of polygyny in hlaiduguri. The same 
analytical framework can be applied to the study of polygyny 
in other cultures. Furthermore, the economic approach can be 
extended to other aspects of kinship 
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